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SON ALLEGING ADULTERINE BASTARDY HELD
TO HAVE NO TORT ACTION AGAINST FATHER
Zepeda v. Zepeda
41 Ii. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E. 2d 849 (1963)
In an action by a son' against his father, it was alleged that defendant
willfully and fraudulently induced plaintiff's mother to have sexual relations
with him by promising to marry her when in fact, unknown to the mother,
defendant was already married. Plaintiff further alleged that due to his
subsequent birth as an adulterine bastard he was injured in his person,
property, and reputation. He sought damages for the deprivation of his
rights to legitimacy, a normal home, a legal father, and inheritance from
his father and paternal ancestors; and damages for being stigmatized as a
bastard.
2
While the Appellate Court of Illinois3 designated the alleged wrong as
a tort which caused irreparable injury if legitimation could not take place,
it unanimously affirmed an order dismissing the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action. The court concluded that to allow redress "could
be so far-reaching, that the policy of the State should be declared by the
representatives of the people,"'4 the General Assembly.
Assuming that plaintiff had sustained injuries for which he might
otherwise recover, the court considered whether the law would recognize
him as having had sufficient existence that a tort could have been inflicted
upon him simultaneously with his conception; this interesting question
was answered affirmatively. The court noted the judicial trend of the
last 20 years to depart from a long followed precedent, Dietrich v. Inhabi-
tants of Northampton,5 a decision which held that prenatal injuries were
not actionable at the instance of the child injured. The test of viability of
the foetus at the time of the injury, a test which was developed subse-
quently to the Dietrich case, is also being discarded, 6 and the court was
1 The son is a minor suing by his next friend. His age is not revealed in the
opinion.
2 These factual averments were assumed to be true for purposes of considering
a motion to strike the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
The right to support is not put in issue by the complaint. While paternity would
have to be either admitted or proven in a bastardy action to entitle plaintiff either
to support or to damages in a tort action, the established right to support is a dis-
sociable cause of action which would be unaffected by recovery in this case, and sup-
port will not be given further consideration.
3 Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 IM. App.2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963).
4 Id. at 263, 190 N.E.2d at 859.
5 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
6 For a more complete history of the trend away from the Dietrich precedent,
including a good compilation of the arguments advanced by the courts both for and
against recovery for prenatal injuries, see Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 1059 (1950), supple-
mented by Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1256 (1953).
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willing to hold that a tort might have been inflicted on plaintiff approxi-
mately at the moment of his conception. The court concluded that regard-
less of when plaintiff became a "person" as that word is understood in tort
law, when he did, the wrong became an actionable wrong. While this
conclusion may not yet represent a generally accepted principle of tort law,
the court's analysis is persuasive.
In considering whether defendant had breached a duty toward plaintiff,
the court concluded that defendant's act might be considered tortious in
that it "was willful and, perhaps, criminal . .. [and] defendant was com-
pletely indifferent to the foreseeable consequences of his act."7 Defendant's
adultery was willful, but the court does not face the question of whether the
resultant conception was volitional, or reckless, or only negligent in that
an attempt at contraception was made. Plaintiff complains only of his con-
ception, and recovery for negligently caused mental distress is rare, norm-
ally, the tort must be intentional. To sustain the complaint defendant must
be treated as if he knew that conception would result from his act; i.e.,
knowledge that conception would result is not an element of the cause of
action, and attempted contraception is not a defense. The court's im-
plied presumptions may be defensible in that defendant's intentions would
not change the consequences of conception and defendant's adultery is
not a privilege to be protected by the law. The essence of the tort,
therefore, seems to be that defendant may be charged as a matter of law
with knowledge that conception would result, that he knew as an adulterer
that he could not legitimatize the child, and that he could foresee the stigma
which the child would suffer." Defendant is not absolved by an "illegiti-
macy-or-nothing" argument to the general effect that he created the life
and existence which, arguendo, plaintiff would never have had but for the
act which plaintiff now calls a tort. Plaintiff did not bargain for life as an
adulterine bastard.
The court found that the complaint stated no cause of action for de-
famation for the reason that "publication" was not alleged. The court
further noted the possible availability of "truth" as a complete defense.
The law of defamation may, however, help plaintiff to show he has been
damaged. Recovery is allowed plaintiffs in defamation cases due to the
invasion of their reputations and good names, and the tort may sometimes
be closely related to mental suffering.9 If the epithet "bastard" is humili-
7 Zepeda v. Zepeda, supra note 3, at 247, 190 N.E.2d at 852.
8 Herein plaintiff's mother may be absolved, for she apparently anticipated legiti-
mation through marriage which would have eliminated the stigma. Under other cir-
cumstances the question of plaintiff's mother as a defendant might present a problem.
The mother, however, is in a better position to assert a parent-child immunity from
suit because in her case, unlike this defendant's, an action against her would tend to
disrupt a subsisting family unit.
9 For example, in Chiniquy v. Begin, 42 Qu6. C.S. 261, 7 D.L.R. 65 (1912),
reversed 46 Qu6. C.S. 84, 20 D.L.R. 347 (1914), original judgment affirmed, except
as to amount of damages 24 Qu6. B.R. 294, 24 D.L.R. 687 (1915), the defendant
published of a Roman Catholic priest who had renounced his religion and had been
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ating and damaging to one falsely accused, then, a fortiori, it must be
humiliating and damaging to one to whom it comes with a ring of truth.
The court found that the complaint stated no cause of action for
mental suffering for the reason that, while intentionally caused mental
suffering is recognized as a tort in Illinois, such a tort was not sufficiently
alleged. The allegation most closely approximating mental distress, "His
father has wilfully injured and wronged him . . . in stigmatizing him as
an adulterine bastard," was held to be inadequate.' 0 The court did not
suggest how mental suffering might properly be alleged in this case. They
did note that "if it did outline such an action, it would be an interesting
speculation whether a charge of mental distress and emotional suffering
could be made and sustained in behalf of an infant."" Subsequently,
without addressing the question of whether a charge of mental suffering
might be sustained on behalf of an infant, the court rhetorically inquired
as to how often an illegitimate might try to conceal his parentage and how
often he might wince in shame when it is revealed, and they observed that
"laws cannot temper the cruelty of those who hurl the epithet 'bastard' nor
ease the bitterness in him who hears it, knowing it to be true."'1 2  It may
be assumed, also, that any recovery by plaintiff in this action would in-
clude all damages which he might suffer throughout his potential adulthood.
Plaintiff complains that he has no normal home, and the court replies
that it cannot give an illegitimate child rights superior to those of a legiti-
mate child. Plaintiff says that he has been deprived of his inheritance from
his father and from his paternal ancestors, but it seems reasonable to reply
that this is not inherent in his status as a bastard. Society can and does
exercise statutory control over the devolution of property. The one injury
legally married and had a child that such a priest was not legally married and the
woman was his concubine. While defendant's charges may, perhaps, have been true
in terms of church dogma, plaintiff, the priest's daughter, was not a bastard in civil
law, and she recovered in an action for libel when the court declared the publication
to be insulting, humiliating and damaging in the extreme to the daughter.
10 Zepeda v. Zepeda, supra note 3, at 254, 190 N.E.2d at 855.
11 Ibid. Two cases involving stigma of a different kind, briefed and argued ex-
tensively in the United States Supreme Court, support the answer that charges of
mental suffering can be sustained on behalf of an infant. In Brown v. The Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483, at 494 (1954), the Court stated of children in segregated
grade and high schools: "To separate them from others of similar age and qualifi-
cations solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to
be undone." In the more recent Lord's Prayer cases Mr. Justice Brennan included
in his concurring opinion a well documented discussion of the stigma and its effects
on young children who might take advantage of the permission given them to leave
their classrooms during religious exercises. Abington School District v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, at 290 (1963) (Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring). The stigma of ille-
gitimacy may differ in kind from the stigma of racial and religious prejudice; the
effect on one, especially a child, who is the obpect of such prejudice is less easily
distinguished.
12 Zepeda v. Zepeda, supra note 3, at 258, 190 N.E.2d at 857.
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of which plaintiff impliedly complains which persuasively demands redress
is the mental anguish which he suffers due to society's recognition and
treatment of an irretrievable situation-he is an adulterine bastard.
While the court concluded that plaintiff's complaint alleged his injury
by a tortious act, a new tort which it characterized as an action for "wrong-
ful life," it affirmed dismissal of the complaint because "the interest of
society is so involved, the action needed to redress the tort could be so far-
reaching, that the policy of that State should be declared by the representa-
tives of the people."' 3 It was deterred not so much by the potential flood
of litigation by illegitimates as by the possibility of similar actions for dam-
ages on account of race, color, poverty, hereditary disease, inherited family
characteristics, and unsavory reputations of parents. It also noted po-
tential claims arising out of artificial insemination and intentional genetic
mutations. None of these hypothetical cases suggested by the court were
at issue here. If they did come before the court for decision, most of such
claims might be distinguished because, while the child might show injury,
other values militate against characterizing the conduct of the parents as
tortious; in the case at bar there is neither moral or social justification for
allowing the defendant adulterer to procreate by seduction under promise
of marriage. Moreover, if complainants in the hypothetical cases which
concerned the court were to present meritorious claims, they too should
be granted redress.
It is difficult for another reason to accept the court's conclusion that
to allow plaintiff's action would be too far-reaching. Inasmuch as new
law was made where there once had been a judicial vacuum, the decision
itself was in fact far-reaching. The potential consequences of such a de-
cision are illustrated by Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton,'14 the
leading precedent for the proposition that prenatal injuries were not
actionable at the instance of the child, in which the court was influenced
by the absence of precedents allowing such actions. It became a precedent
which itself inhibited recovery in similar actions for 60 years. The Zepeda
court may not overcome this objection by arguing that its decision was
limited to the particular complaint before it; the far-reaching nature of the
decision was its only rationale for denying recovery. Although the court
apparently thought that redress was called for, it may have done much to
inhibit future recovery in this and similar cases.
The court was concerned about the role of the Illinois General As-
sembly as representatives of the people. Certainly a decision to allow
recovery in this case ought neither to bind nor inhibit the General As-
sembly. It would be far more likely to give this question the consideration
desired by the court had the court's decision been the other way.
'3 Id. at 262-63, 190 N.E.2d at 859.
14 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
15 The absence of contrary precedents, together with the Dietrich case, were often
cited by subsequent courts who either denied or limited actions for prenatal injuries.
See Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 1059 (1950), supplemented by Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1256
(1953).
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The apparent aggravated circumstances of this case, the deceit prac-
ticed by defendant upon plaintiff's mother, together with the fact that
plaintiff was not only born illegitimate, but was an adulterine bastard,
make it unlikely that any similar case will present a more persuasive basis
for recovery.

